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Abstract
How important are economies of scale in exporting? We argue that firm size
cannot be the main determinant of export status if a model is to be consistent
with the observed number and size of exporters. Instead, we need a lot of variation
independent of firm size to reconcile the model with the data. We show the
augmented model also has markedly different implications regarding the margin
of adjustment in the event of a trade liberalization: Most of the adjustment
is through the intensive margin and productivity gains due to reallocation are
halved.
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1. Introduction
Exporters represent less than 20 percent of all U.S. manufacturing firms and
are larger than non-exporters—total sales per firm are about 4-5 times higher
for exporters.1 These stylized facts are often cited as support for models with
economies of scale and firm heterogeneity. In Melitz (2003), only larger, more
productive firms generate enough net revenues abroad to cover the fixed costs
associated with exporting. A key implication is that, in the event of a trade
liberalization, resources will be reallocated toward the more productive firms,
raising the average productivity in the industry.
In this paper we evaluate the quantitative importance of economies of scale
for understanding the export behavior of firms. We start by exploring the stark
hypothesis that economies of scale are the only determinant of the export status
of the firm. Firms differ only in productivity, as in Melitz (2003). We show
how to derive the model’s predictions just by focusing on a single equilibrium
condition, the export entry condition. The economies of scale imply that we
should observe exporters and non-exporters to be strictly sorted by sales; that
is, the smallest exporter should be larger than the largest non-exporter. The
set of exporters is thus easily characterized with a cut-off rule in terms of total
sales. We use the cut-off property to derive the implications for exporter size
given the share of exporters and the distribution of total sales, without having
1. Both facts are documented in Bernard et al. (2007) for the universe of U.S.
manufacturing firms operating in 2002.
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to specify the full model.2 Given that exporters are roughly one-fifth of all
firms, strict sorting implies that exporters should be concentrated in the top
quintile of the firm size distribution. We find that the firms below the top
quintile are quite small (an average of $740,000 total sales), while the firms in
the top quintile are much larger ($70 million on average)—reflecting the huge
skewness in the firm size distribution. Hence, the model greatly overpredicts
the exporter size premium: exporters should have between 90 and 100 times
more total sales than non-exporters, instead of just the ratio of 4 to 5 observed
in the data.3
We proceed to reconcile the economies-of-scale model with the data by
introducing additional firm-level heterogeneity. We take a latent variable
approach so there is no need to specify which are the additional sources of
variation in the export decision—only that these factors are independent of
firm size. We find a lot of size-independent variation is needed to match the
observed frequency and size of exporters. In other words, total sales are a poor
predictor of the export status of a firm.4
2. We use the distribution of total sales for manufacturing firms (NAICS code 31-33) as
given by the 2002 Statistics of U.S. Businesses of the Census.
3. Of course, we did not expect the strict sorting of exporters to hold exactly in the data.
Melitz (2003) certainly does not intend to preclude the importance of other idiosyncratic
factors in the export decision.
4. We also note that the introduction of the latent heterogeneity helps explain the large
fraction of exporters with little foreign sales, even if the foreign to domestic sales ratio is
taken to be constant across exporters.
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We then explore whether introducing the necessary size-independent
variation alters the model’s predictions in the event of a trade liberalization.
We set up a partial equilibrium model based on Melitz (2003). We then explore
two versions of the model. In the first version—which we call the strict sorting
model—productivity is the only source of variation across firms. The model
displays the strict sorting property and thus exporters are counter-factually
very large. In the second version we assume firms face heterogeneous fixed
costs—replicating the latent heterogeneity model. We calibrate the distribution
of fixed costs to match the share and size of exporters. We then compare the
models’ predictions in response to a fall in trade costs.
We find that, in the aggregate, both models are indistinguishable from
a representative-firm model. Free entry amplifies the response of exports to
a trade liberalization through the love-of-variety effect. However, firm-level
heterogeneity virtually cancels all the amplification introduced by free entry.
This holds for both the strict-sorting and the latent-heterogeneity models,
suggesting the introduction of heterogeneity simply does not affect the response
of aggregate trade and export prices.5
Behind the similarities in the aggregate there are large differences in the
margins of adjustment. Critically, the latent heterogeneity model has only a
5. Atkeson and Burstein (2010) find that the firms’ responses to a trade liberalization
do not quantitatively impact the implications for aggregate productivity and welfare in a
general equilibrium model. We must emphasize that ours is a partial equilibrium model, so
the offsetting effects are not due to factor prices or aggregate demand adjusting in general
equilibrium. Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) document conditions such that
heterogeneity is irrelevant for the welfare gains from a trade liberalization.
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minor role for the extensive margin. First, there is much less entry: We find
that the growth rate of the number of exporters is more than 60 percent in the
strict sorting version, but only 15 percent in the latent heterogeneity version.
Second, new exporters are about one third of the size of existing exporters
in the latent heterogeneity model. This stands in marked contrast with the
standard Melitz model in which new exporters are 10 to 12 times smaller than
the average exporter prior to trade liberalization. We decompose total export
growth in an intensive and extensive margin and find that the strict-sorting
model the extensive margin accounts for more than 60 percent of the trade
growth. In contrast, the extensive margin accounts for less than 20 percent
once we match the size of exporters.
Finally we look at the aggregate productivity gains due to the reallocation
effect across both models. We find that the productivity gains due to trade
liberalization are halved in the augmented model. In short, the large amount of
size-independent variation “waters down” the core mechanism of re-allocation
from non-exporters to exporters.6
We are not the first to introduce additional heterogeneity in a trade model
with economies of scale in order to fit firm- or plant-level data. Two well-known
contributions are Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007), who estimate a model
with fixed and sunk costs using Colombian plant data; and Eaton, Kortum,
and Kramarz (2011), who estimate a model of firm heterogeneity and export
6. However, it must be noted that we miss on the productivity gains due to exit in
the domestic market, since ours is partial equilibrium model and the wage rate—or more
generally, unit costs—is taken as given.
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participation using data from France. Both papers aim for a near-complete
fit of the data and correspondingly require rich and complex models with
many sources of heterogeneity—correlated firm-market demand shocks and
fixed costs, for example. Their success is a testament to how far trade models
have progressed in quantitative analysis, but does not offer a clear guidance
regarding which model features are indispensable to explore the implications
of a trade liberalization.
We view our paper as a complement to their approach, providing a
transparent evaluation of the key mechanism in the Melitz model. First, we
focus on only two empirical moments, namely, the frequency of exporters
and their size premium relative to nonexporters, to be combined with the
distribution of total sales.7 Second, we impose as little structure as possible
when introducing the necessary heterogeneity to match the data. Our results
also highlight the implications of the dispersion in fixed costs, while the
literature has ocused on the average fixed cost.
Some researchers have also extended the Melitz model seeking to explain
some particular facts of interest. Johnson (2012) and Kugler and Verhoogen
(2012) introduce firm-level variation in output quality in order to explain
several facts regarding unit values and firm size, respectively. In a similar
setting, Hallak and Sivadasan (2011) talk of differences in “caliber” among
firms and note that such differences are necessary to break the monotone
7. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to highlight the key role played by these
two facts. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011), for example, exclude non-exporters from
the model estimation.
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relationship between size and export status. Nocke and Yeaple (2012) explore
firm heterogeneity in managerial resources and talent: firms with high labor
productivity export, but not all exporters are large and not all large firms
export. Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2011) structurally estimate a firm-level
model of imports, using our method to calibrate the dispersion in the fixed costs
of importing. Dynamic models naturally generate heterogeneity across firms
through past investment decisions and exporter hysteresis due to sunk costs:
See for example Ruhl (2008), Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011), and Alessandria and
Choi (2012).
The empirical literature has not come to a consensus on the quantitative
importance of the extensive margin for aggregate trade patterns. Two papers
are well known for arguing that the extensive margin is an important dimension
of aggregate data. Hummels and Klenow (2005) find that the extensive margin
accounts for 60 percent of the cross-country differences in trade. Broda and
Weinstein (2006) find large welfare gains associated with the expansion in
import variety for the U.S over the last three decades. Both papers build upon
the analysis in Feenstra (1994) and share a focus on the long run.
Recently, several papers have taken the position that the extensive margin
contributes little to aggregate trade patterns. Besedes and Prusa (2011) argue
that new exporting relationships have little impact on long-run export growth
because they tend to be very short-lived. Arkolakis et al. (2008) document
a sizeable increase in variety in Costa Rica from 1986 to 1992. They argue,
though, that the increase did not translate into large welfare gains because new
varieties were imported in small quantities. Armenter and Koren (forthcoming)
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show that several well-known facts about the extensive margin are the result
of the sparsity of the data.
2. On the Size of Exporters
We start by deriving the quantitative predictions when economies of scale are
the only determinant of the export status of a firm. As in Melitz (2003), firm i
will export only if its foreign sales, net of the associated variable costs, would
cover the fixed costs associated with exporting,
r∗i − c∗i ≥ f. (1)
Firms differ in their labor productivity or in the quality of goods produced.
Either way, more efficient firms can generate more net income abroad and are
thus more likely to be exporters. Hence, the model predicts that exporters
are more productive and/or sell higher quality goods than non-exporters.
Incidentally, more efficient firms also sell more in the domestic market, so
exporters are unambiguously larger than non-exporters in terms of total sales.
These qualitative predictions are borne out in the data and often cited as
support for economies of scale in exporting.
We seek a quantitative evaluation of economies of scale and how they shape
the set of exporters. We show here how to do so only on the basis of export entry
condition (1), without having to specify or calibrate the rest of the model. The
first step is to rewrite the entry condition (1) in terms of total sales. In Melitz
(2003), firms compare their potential export sales with the fixed cost, and decide
whether to export or not. Of course, we only observe foreign sales for firms
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that actually export. Fortunately, there is a tight relationship between a firm’s
total sales and its underlying efficiency parameter in the model: a firm with
higher productivity will always have more total sales in equilibrium. Since net
income abroad is also strictly increasing in productivity, we have an increasing,
monotone relationship between total sales and net income abroad—even if the
latter is counterfactual because the firm does not export. We can then use
data on total sales, which are easily accessible and observed independently of
whether the firm exports.
We thus summarize the set of exporters with a simple threshold rule in
place of (1): firm i will export only if its total sales ri are above some level t,
ri ≥ t. (2)
It is immediate that exporters and non-exporters are strictly sorted by size;
that is, the smallest exporting firm has more total sales than the largest non-
exporting firm. In a fully developed structural model, the value of the threshold
level t is determined in equilibrium and is bound to depend on the parameters
as well as the choice of several specifications. We show below how we can derive
the quantitative predictions straight from the data on the basis of (2) alone:
what we call the strict sorting model.
The threshold condition (2) implies that the share of exporters is equal to
the fraction of firms with total sales equal or larger than t. We have thus that
sx = 1−Ψr (t), where Ψr is the empirical cumulative distribution function of
total sales, and sx is the fraction of firms with positive export sales. In other
words, we can solve for the (1− sx)th percentile in the distribution of total sales
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and obtain the threshold t consistent with the observed share of exporters. We
can then easily compute the truncated mean,
E {ri|ri ≥ t} =
∫ ∞
t
ri
dΨr (ri)
sx
.
The truncated mean is the strict sorting model prediction for the average total
sales for exporters.
Bernard et al. (2007) report that only 18 percent of the U.S. manufacturing
firms had positive sales abroad in 2002.8 Exporters, thus, are relatively rare. For
the distribution of total sales we look at the 2002 Statistics of U.S. Businesses
published by the Census. Table 1 summarizes the data for manufacturing firms.
As is well known, there is an enormous amount of skewness in the firm-size
distribution. The average firm sells $13.2 million, and yet 45 percent of the
firms sell less than $500, 000. In short, there are many, many small firms and a
few very, very large ones.
Size bin Frequency Cumulative Frequency Average sales
0–$100,000 0.145 0.145 $55,600
$100,000–$500,000 0.305 0.450 $257,000
$500,000–$1 million 0.144 0.594 $718,000
$1–5 million 0.257 0.851 $2.26 million
$5–10 million 0.060 0.911 $6.84 million
$10–50 million 0.063 0.974 $19.3 million
$50–100 million 0.010 0.984 $56.4 million
over $100 million 0.015 1.000 $670 million
All Firms $13.2 million
Table 1. The distribution of firm sales in manufacturing – Census
8. Exporters are similarly scarce if we look at plants or establishments rather than firms—
see Bernard et al. (2003), for example. The scarcity of exporters has also been confirmed in
a variety of countries.
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From Table 1 we see that the 82nd percentile falls somewhere between $1
and $5 million sales, definitively closer to the latter. This already suggests that
non-exporters are expected to be quite small under strict sorting: firms below
$1 million sales average less than $320, 000 in sales and would constitute over
70 percent of all non-exporters. At the same time, exporters will be quite large.
Firms above $1 million average $82 million in total sales and would represent
over 80 percent of all exporters. We want to be more precise than this, though.
To do so we only need to specify the distribution of firms within the range
of $1 − $5 million total sales.9 We assume firms in this particular bin follow
a two-side truncated Pareto distribution, parameterized to match the average
total sales in the range ($2.26 million).
We find that strict sorting by size implies that exporters should sell, on
average, between 90 and 100 times more than non-exporters. The exporter
size premium remains very large for whatever distribution one assumes for the
firms in the $1− $5 million range. As a check we computed the lower bound
on the exporter’s size implied by Table 1 by taking all firms with sales between
$1 million and $5 million to be identical, with total sales equal to the bin’s
average ($2.26 million). Even in this case we find that exporters are predicted
to be more than 80 times larger than non-exporters.
9. There is no need to assume anything about the distribution of firms outside this size
bin as they are all squarely in the exporter or non-exporter category.
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How does the implied exporter size premium compare with the data?
Bernard et al. (2007) report that exporters are 4 to 5 times larger than non-
exporters.10 Strict sorting thus greatly overpredicts the size differences between
exporters and non-exporters. Table 2 compares the predicted size of exporters
and non-exporters with the data for U.S. manufacturing firms in 2002. Under
the hypothesis of strict sorting, exporters should have, on average, $70.1 million
in total sales—double what we actually observe. In the model non-exporters are
expected to be very small, just $740, 000 in total sales. In the data, though, there
are non-exporters that are large enough to bring their average total sales above
$8 million. Clearly, larger firms are indeed more likely to export in the data,
but only a little bit more. In the model, though, the conditional probability of
exporting rises very sharply, taking value 0 if ri is below the cutoff t, and one
otherwise.11
Data Strict Sorting
Average Sales - Non-exporters $8.1 million $740,000
Average Sales - Exporters $36.4 million $70.1 million
Exporter Size Premium 4.5 95
Table 2. Exporters and non-exporters in the model and the data
10. Table 3 in Bernard et al. (2007) states that the difference in average log shipments
between exporters and non-exporters is 1.48 for the same set of firms we used. The
finding that exporters are larger than non-exporters has also been confirmed for plants
and establishments, as well as for other countries. The size differences are all in the range
between 4 and 6.
11. The strict sorting model maximizes the correlation between exporting and firm size:
the predicted joint distribution of sales and export status is actually the Fre´chet maximal
distribution given the respective marginal distributions.
11
It is possible that some exporters were mistakenly recorded as non-exporters
in the data. We redo the previous exercise assuming that the actual share of
exporters is sx = .25—which implies than close to 30 percent of non-exporters
were actually misclassified. We still find that strict sorting implies an exporter
size premium of almost 90.12 As we increase the share of exporters further,
the predicted size premium declines but only slowly, since non-exporters are
predicted to be even smaller than before. For example, say we take exporters
to be twice as frequent as recorded in the data, sx = .35. The average total
sales of exporters is then very close to the data. Non-exporters, though, are
then very small (less than $500,000) and the implied size premium is about 75.
Is our result unique to the U.S.? We redo the exercise using data for French
firms as reported in Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2010).13 We find that
the implied size premium is above 54, and possibly around 60—well above
its empirical counterpart.
Due to its ubiquitous nature in the literature, we have also experimented
with a parameterized Pareto distribution for the total sales distribution. The
Pareto distribution is not a good approximation of the overall firm size
distribution—only its upper tail. We can thus view this exercise as ignoring
the data regarding smaller firms which, after all, add to a small fraction of
the overall economy. To pin down the exporter size premium, we only need
12. In the online Appendix we show that the gap between data and model remains very
large across a range of specifications and values for measurement error.
13. Table 5. The data include around 60 percent of manufacturing firms in 1986. Only 14
percent of them export.
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the slope parameter for the Pareto distribution that fits the data best. Axtell
(2001) estimates a Pareto parameter of 1.024, which implies an exporter size
premium of 110 under strict sorting.14 On the upper end of the estimates, a
slope parameter k = 1.065 brings the exporter size premium down to 41. Note
the latter number is actually half the lower bound on the size premium implied
by the actual distribution, clearly indicating that the Pareto distribution is
ignoring the left tail of the firm size distribution. In order to match the share
and size of exporters, we would require to set k = 1.65, well above any estimate.
3. Introducing Latent Heterogeneity
Of course, we did not expect the strict sorting of exporters to hold exactly in
the data. Melitz (2003) certainly does not intend to preclude the importance of
other idiosyncratic factors, unrelated to size, in the firm’s decision to export.
In this Section we introduce latent heterogeneity, unrelated to size and thus to
the economies of scale, in the decision to export. We then evaluate the role of
the economies of scale against the latent heterogeneity.
3.1. Fitting the data
We proceed to fit the data by introducing the necessary firm-level heterogeneity
in the export decision. We rewrite the threshold condition (2) in terms of a
latent variable, ti. A firm i exports if its total sales satisfy
14. Estimates in Luttmer (2007) and elsewhere are also very close to one. See online
Appendix for a derivation of the size premium under a Pareto distribution.
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ri ≥ ti. (3)
The latent variable is identically and independently distributed across firms,
with a c.d.f. Ψt over support <+. Thus the realization ti is independent of the
size of the firm i.
With the latent variable condition (3) we can capture all of the underlying
heterogeneity without having to specify the sources of variation. Indeed, the
only structure imposed on the latent variable is that it is independent of firm
size.
It is now useful to fit the empirical distribution of total sales with a
parametric distribution. We use a lognormal distribution with mean µr = 6.3
and standard deviation σr = 2.6—so we reproduce the average total sales
(in thousands of dollars) as well as the approximated location of the 82th
percentile.
We also assume that the latent variable ti follows a lognormal distribution.
This is mainly a choice of convenience: we want a flexible two-parameter
distribution defined over positive numbers. We pick the mean µt and standard
deviation σt such that the model reproduces the share and size of exporters.
That is, we solve for µt and σt such that equations
sx =
∫
Ψt (r)dΨr (r) , (4)
E {log (ri) |ri ≥ ti} =
∫
log (r) Ψt (r)dΨr (r) /sx, (5)
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where Ψt denotes the c.d.f. of the latent variable distribution, reproduce the
observed values for the share of exporters, sx = .18, and the average log total
sales of exporters, E {log (ri) |ri ≥ ti} = 5.66.15
The latent variable is very dispersed: we find that the parameter values
matching moments (4)-(5) are µt = 13.73 and σt = 7.7. These parameters
imply that the coefficient of variation of the latent variable is many orders of
magnitude larger than for total sales! We explored an array of parameters for
the distribution of total sales and found always that we need a huge dispersion
for the latent variable in order to reproduce the share and size of exporters.
More precisely, we consider values µr in the range 5.5− 7.5 and σr in the range
2 − 3. The resulting parameters for µt and σt were always above 10 and 5,
respectively.
The results are perhaps not that surprising: after all, we have to make up for
a large gap between the strict-sorting model and the data in the size premium of
exporters. In order to reduce the size of exporters we need the latent variable
to take very large values with high probability, so some large firms do not
export. Simultaneously, some other firms must draw a low realization of the
latent variable and export independently of their size.16
15. Here we use the log total sales instead of total sales, so the exporter size premium is
now given by the difference in average log total sales between exporters and non-exporters.
The change of units has virtually no implication for the parameters of the latent variable
distribution—but it turns out to be very convenient for the calibration of the model later.
16. It is also necessary to introduce latent heterogeneity in order to match the dynamic
facts. Entry and exit rates in foreign markets are relatively high, as documented in Bernard,
Jensen and Schott (2007). The volatility of firm employment in the data is clearly too low
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Moreover, there are also good reasons to view our findings as a lower bound
on the dispersion of the latent variable. Firms often carry multiple product
lines, and there are many foreign markets to serve. However, it only takes one
product to be exported to one destination for a firm to be called an exporter.
Hence, if we think each market/product offers an independent opportunity
to export, we have to see the latent variable ti as the minimum realization
among the ensemble of product- and destination-specific thresholds. Thus, the
underlying distribution from which the product- and destination-specific latent
variables are drawn would feature much more dispersion.
3.2. The role of firm size
The huge dispersion of the latent variable indicates that firm size plays only
a small role in the determination of the export status of a firm. We can
illustrate this point with a simple exercise. Note that given a firm size ri,
the probability that firm i exports is Pr(ri ≥ ti|ri) or simply Ψt (ri). Given
our estimates, a firm of median size exports with probability .167, very close
to the unconditional probability of .18.17 In other words, a firm of median size
could be taken as representative of the industry as a whole. In contrast, a firm
with the median latent variable will export only with probability .0016. Table
3 repeats the exercise with the 25th and 75th percentiles for total sales and the
latent variable.
to explain these high rates in a basic Melitz model: firms rarely grow or contract enough to
start and stop exporting so frequently. See Atkeson and Burstein (2010) for a discussion.
17. The median size is given by exp (µr) or approximately $600, 000.
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Percentile
Ordered 25th 50th 75th
By total sales .1179 .1674 .2286
By latent variable 10−7 .0016 .1881
Table 3. Conditional probability of exporting
Next we set to measure the explanatory power of a firm’s total sales on its
export status. Following Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011), we compute a
pseudo-R2 as
R = 1− E
[
V C (r)
]
V U
where V C (r) is the variance of an exporter dummy, conditional on a sales
level r; and V U is the unconditional variance of the exporter dummy.18
The unconditional variance is pinned down by the share of exporters, V U =
sx(1 − sx), since the exporter dummy follows a Bernoulli distribution with
success probability sx. The conditional variance is again easily computed using
our latent-variable distribution, as the conditional export probability is Ψt(r)
and thus V C (r) = Ψt(r) (1−Ψt(r)). We then integrate across sales levels,
E
[
V C (r)
]
=
∫
V C (r)dΨr(r).
We find that firm size explains only 5 percent of the overall variation in
export participation. This result contrasts with Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz
(2011), who report that over half of the variation in market access is attributed
to the firm’s productivity. However, the two results cannot be directly compared
for several reasons. In particular, Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011) analyze
“market entry” for each of 112 possible foreign countries, and thus their result
18. See Section 4.7.1 in Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011) for further discussion.
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is mainly driven by the number of countries exporters sell to.19 Our calculation
is instead for export participation. As a firm is classified as an exporter as long
as it sells to one foreign country, it only takes a single low realization of the fixed
cost (or a high one of the demand shock) among the 112 independent draws
for a firm to export. Thus the explanatory power of the common component
may be substantial for a typical, single foreign market yet small for the overall
export status of the firm.
3.3. Small exporters
Finally we note that matching the size premium of exporters helps explain why
a large fraction of exporters actually sell very little abroad.20 Small exporters
are clearly at odds with economies of scale, as it is hard to reconcile exporters
with very little foreign revenues with the overall low number of exporters.
Arkolakis (2010) develops a theory of market penetration in which export
intensity is increasing with size. Our first observation is that, as long as the
strict property is preserved, variation in export intensity cannot reconcile the
model with the data. The simplest way to see this is to compute the exporter
19. Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011) assume that each market-firm pair has an
independent realization of a fixed cost and a demand shock. The latter also disconnects
domestic sales from productivity, which is another possible reason why our results are so
different.
20. See Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2007), and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004).
Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2007) report that more than 75 percent of all exporters sell
less than $1 million abroad, with plenty of firms selling a very small amount abroad—e.g.,
less than $20,000.
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size premium in terms of domestic sales under strict sorting, following the same
procedure we did with total sales. We report the results in Table 4. Excluding
foreign sales does not reduce the disparity between the data and model. This
is perhaps not surprising given that foreign sales are a small fraction of total
sales for the U.S.
Data Model
Ave. Domestic Sales - NX $8.1 million $740,000
Ave. Domestic Sales - X $31.3 million $60.3 million
Exporter Size Premium 3.8 81.5
Table 4. Exporter size premium in terms of domestic sales.
Once we introduce latent heterogeneity small exporters arise naturally
without variation in export intensity. A small firm may export despite its low
productivity if it draws a small fixed cost. Such a firm will export little, since
it will not be competitive abroad. Similarly some very productive firms do not
export despite their large potential foreign sales because they draw a very high
fixed cost.
4. A Simple Framework of Exports and Exporters
In this Section we set up a model with economies of scale and firm
heterogeneity.21 The model is simpler than Melitz (2003) in that it is a partial-
equilibrium model, taking the wage rate as given. As a result the model
abstracts from entry and exit in the domestic market.
21. The online Appendix contains a detailed description of the model.
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We explore the implications of the additional heterogeneity for an episode
of trade liberalization. To this end we consider two versions of the model. In the
first, there is strict sorting, so the model does not match the size of exporters.
In the second version, we introduce the needed variation as a random fixed
cost. The rest of the parameters are common across models.
4.1. Framework
There is a set Ω of firms that produce and sell in the home country. Firms are
heterogeneous in their productivity, denoted ϕ, and the fixed costs they face if
they start exporting, denoted f . Productivity and fixed costs are independently
distributed over <+ with c.d.f. G and H, respectively. We summarize a firm
by its type ω = {ϕ, f}. The set of firms Ω (and their distribution) is taken as
a given.
Each firm is the single producer of a differentiated good, operating the
production function y (ω) = ϕ (ω) l (ω), where l (ω) is the labor demanded by
firm ω. Consumers combine the differentiated goods according to
Y d =
[∫
Ω
(
yd (ω)
)ρ
dω
]1/ρ
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) and yd (ω) denote the output of firm ω sold in the home country.
Firms are monopolistic competitors and set the price
pd (ω) =
1
ρ
w
ϕ (ω)
where w is the wage rate and θ = (1− ρ)−1 is the price elasticity. We take the
wage rate as exogenously given, so ours is a partial equilibrium model.
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It is clear that only the productivity parameter ϕ will determine domestic
sales. We can thus write pd (ϕ) and yd (ϕ). The c.e.s. demand structure also
implies that firm ϕ revenues from domestic sales can be expressed
rd (ϕ) =
(
ϕ
ϕ˜
)θ−1
Rd (6)
where Rd are total sales revenues in the domestic market, and
ϕ˜ =
[∫ ∞
0
ϕθ−1dG (ϕ)
] 1
θ−1
is the average productivity defined as in Melitz (2003). Equation (6) delivers
the key relationship between productivity and domestic sales.
We now move to the determination of exports and exporters. Not all firms
export: let Ωx denote the set of firms that do and Mx its measure. We normalize
the measure of all firms to one, so Mx is also the share of exporters. Consumers
in the foreign country combine the subset of exported goods according to a CES
aggregate, with identical parameter ρ. The export price index is
P f =
[∫
Ωx
(
pf (ω)
)1−θ
dω
] 1
1−θ
. (7)
To close the model, we require an aggregate demand for exports, given by
Y f = Y ∗
(
P f
)−ν
, (8)
where Y ∗ is the (exogenously given) income of the foreign country, and ν is
the price elasticity of aggregate exports of the home country. We assume that
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ν < θ; that is, exports of the home country are closer substitutes of each other
than they are of a good produced elsewhere.
Let us first solve for the export revenues of a firm, taking as given the set
of exporters Ωx. Profit maximization implies that
pf (ω) =
1
ρ
τw
ϕ (ω)
where τ > 1 is an iceberg trade cost associated with exports. It is clear again
that, conditional on exporting, only the productivity parameter ϕ determines
sales. The demand system allows us to write a firm’s export revenues as a
function of the average export revenues within exporters,
rf (ϕ) =
(
ϕ
ϕ˜x
)θ−1
Rf
Mx
(9)
where Rf = P fY f is total export sales and
ϕ˜x =
[
1
Mx
∫
Ωx
(ϕ (ω))θ−1 dω
] 1
θ−1
is the average productivity among exporters. Note that the set of exporters Ωx
affects the export revenues of each firm (9), both through the share of exporters
Mx and the productivity distribution within the set.
Finally, we solve for the set of exporters Ωx. A firm that exports incurs in
a per period fixed cost. As a result, a firm ω will find it profitable to export
only if its net income abroad would cover the fixed expenses,
1
θ
rf (ϕ (ω)) ≥ f (ω) , (10)
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where export net income, that is, export revenues minus costs, is expressed as
rf (ϕ (ω)) /θ. Thus the set of exporters Ωx is the set of firms ω ∈ Ω such that
the entry condition (10) holds.
4.2. Strict sorting and latent heterogeneity
We now consider two versions of the model above. In the first we stick to the
original Melitz model and have a single fixed cost, common to all firms. As a
result exporters and non-exporters are strictly sorted by size and the model
inherits the inability to match the size of exporters as documented in Section
2. We name this first version of the model after the strict sorting property. In
the second calibration we use the dispersion on fixed costs to reproduce the
latent variable distribution we worked out in Section 3. By construction the
model then matches the share and size of exporters. We label this calibration
as the “latent heterogeneity” model.
It must be emphasized that the only difference between the two models is
the distribution of fixed costs. The models will share the same parameter values
for the elasticities, trade costs, and the distribution of productivity. However,
we will set the foreign income Y f parameter differently in each model to ensure
that both models match the amount of exports observed in the data.
We start with the common parameters. We set the elasticity of substitution
across exported goods to θ = 8. This number is essentially in the middle of the
range of estimates surveyed by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004). For the
aggregate demand for home exports (8) we set the price elasticity of ν = 6. Our
baseline trade costs are set at 50 percent, τ = 1.5. This is the midpoint between
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the estimated trade costs in 1987 and 2002 reported by Alessandria and Choi
(2013), and slightly below the findings in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004).
The last common parameter is the distribution of productivity, G. For
the calibration we want to use the observed distribution for total sales.
Unfortunately the mapping from the productivity distribution to the total
sales distribution is not the same for both versions of the model.22 It is
thus not possible to have a common parametrization for G that matches the
observed distribution of total sales in both models. However, we do not want
any difference in the calibration of the models to govern the results—other
than the size of exporters, that is. We thus adopt the following compromise:
we set the productivity distribution to capture all of the variation in total
sales. More precisely, we take G to be a lognormal distribution with standard
deviation equal to σϕ = σr/ (θ − 1). The location parameter can be set such
that the average productivity ϕ˜ among all producers is normalized to one. Table
5 summarizes all of the parameters common to both models.
Parameter Value
Elasticity of Substitution θ 8
Price-Elasticity exports ν 6
Trade Cost τ 1.5
Std.Dev. Log-productivity σϕ .37
Mean Log-productivity µϕ -0.48
Table 5. Calibration - common parameters
Next we get to what makes the strict sorting and latent heterogeneity
models different. For the strict sorting we shut down all of the variation in the
22. Both models share the mapping from G to the distribution of domestic total sales. The
distribution of export sales, though, are different for each model.
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fixed cost, so H is a degenerate distribution at some point f . The value of the
fixed cost f is set such that the share of exporters is 18 percent as in the data.
For the latent heterogeneity model we calibrate the distribution of fixed costs H
such that we capture all the variation in the latent variable ti. For this it is very
convenient to use a log-normal distribution for fixed costs so the mapping is
simple. By construction the latent heterogeneity model replicates the observed
exporter size premium; by appropriate choice of the location parameter, we
match the share of exporters as well. The resulting parameters are µf = .98
and σf = 7.69.
Finally we set foreign income parameter Y f in each model to ensure that
both models reproduce the ratio of total exports to total sales in the industry.
The resulting parameter differs significantly across models: the predictions for
trade levels are very different. To see this, we evaluate total exports over
domestic sales in both models for a common value for the foreign demand Y f
set such that domestic income is roughly one fifth of the world income. For this
baseline, both models overestimate the share of exports over total sales, but the
latent heterogeneity only slightly so. More precisely, the strict sorting model
predicts 67 percent more exports than the latent heterogeneity model, and a
exports to total sales ratio of almost .28. The latent heterogeneity predicts a
ratio of .17, which is not too far from the observed ratio of .15. It is easy to see
why the strict sorting model over-predicts the ratio of exports to total sales.
Strict sorting implies that exporters are very large, thus very productive. Hence
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given the same world demand, exports in the strict sorting model are priced
significantly lower than in the latent heterogeneity model.23
5. Trade Liberalization
We compare the two models’ predictions for export growth in response to a fall
in trade costs. The exercise is labeled as a “trade liberalization, ” but there is no
distinction in our model as to whether it is a tariff reduction or an improvement
in the shipping technology.
5.1. Aggregate response
We find that both models have virtually identical implications for trade volume.
Figure 1 plots the growth rate of different variables (as a percentage rate)
as a function of the fall in trade costs (in percentage points). The solid and
dashed lines correspond to the strict sorting and latent heterogeneity models,
respectively. The top left panel displays the growth rate of exports. Both models
predict that trade will approximately triple once trade costs are cut in half. The
models’ predictions are so similar that the lines are on top of each other for
most of the range of trade costs. The top right panel in Figure 1 displays the
growth rate in the export price index, as given by (7). Again there are no
differences between both models, and the price index falls with trade costs at
23. The flip side of this very same exercise is that, for a common value for the foreign
demand, the latent heterogeneity model would need lower trade costs to explain the observed
export flows. In particular, the strict sorting model requires trade cost to be 10 percentage
points higher than in the latent heterogeneity model.
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Figure 1. Aggregate Exports Trade costs decrease in percentage points. All variables in
growth rates
the same rate for both models. Hence the profile for export revenues is very
similar (bottom left panel). Finally, the bottom right panel in Figure 1 displays
total employment in the industry. The trade liberalization results in a sizeable
expansion of employment, about 10 percent for the largest fall in trade costs
considered.
Why do the two models predict such similar aggregate trade patterns? The
reason is that in both models the aggregate variables are mainly driven by the
demand for exports, equation (8). In the online Appendix we show that the
demand for exports in a representative-firm model can be simply written as
log (Rf ) = − (ν − 1) log (τ) + const. (11)
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Figure 2. Aggregate Exports - Comparison with the Representative Firm Model Trade
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In Figure 2 we have added the representative firm model, indicated with a
dotted line. We plot export growth (top) and the export price growth (bottom)
as a function of the fall in trade costs. Clearly, all three models are very similar
in both prices and quantities.
It may be puzzling that firm-level heterogeneity and the extensive margin
do not make a difference for aggregate variables. The reason is that firm-level
heterogeneity essentially cancels the boost in trade due to the extensive margin.
We can illustrate this by comparing the representative firm model with an
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homogeneous-firm model and a heterogenous-productivity firm model with a
Pareto distribution.24
Endogenous entry indeed amplifies the response of export revenues to a fall
in trade costs. For an homogeneous firm model, export revenues are given by
log (Rf ) = −(θ − 1) (ν − 1)
θ − ν log (τ) + const. (12)
The elasticity of export revenues with respect to trade costs is augmented
by (θ − 1)/(θ − ν) relative to the representative firm model. Everything else
constant, more exporters bring the aggregate price of exports down through a
love-of-variety effect. As long as there is entry, the price of exports will then
fall by more than one-to-one with trade costs and sustain additional demand
for exports. For the choice of parameters reported in Table 5, the response of
trade volume is more than twice as large in the homogeneous firm model than
in the representative firm model.
We now look at a simple heterogeneous-productivity firm model with a
Pareto distribution. Aggregate exports are given by
log (Rf ) = −
[
1
ν − 1 −
1
θ − 1 +
1
k
]−1
log (τ) + const (13)
where k is the slope of the Pareto distribution. Comparing (12) with (13) it
is clear that the response in trade in the heterogeneous firm model is between
those in the representative firm model and the homogeneous firm model. As
24. These models are described in detail in the online Appendix. The notation for
parameters is the same as in the main framework presented earlier.
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k grows large, the heterogeneous model approaches the homogeneous model
and the export growth is the largest. This is not surprising, since the Pareto
distribution becomes degenerate, with all of the mass at the location parameter.
For low k, the Pareto distribution features a thick tail. In this case the
response of exports to a fall in trade costs is quite muted. The firms that
start exporting in response to the fall in trade costs are less productive than
incumbent exporters. Thus the average productivity among exporters falls
rapidly, which in turn drives the aggregate price of exports up. The more
skewed is the distribution of productivity, the faster the average productivity
drops with entry.
Quantitatively, we find that the heterogeneity cancels virtually all of
the amplification introduced by entry, rendering the heterogeneous and the
representative firm models very similar in their implications for export growth.
The right tail in the observed distribution of total sales is well approximated by
a Pareto with a slope parameter ξ in the range 1.02− 1.06. Setting k = ξ(θ− 1)
we can rewrite the response of exports in the heterogeneous firm model (13) as
log (Rf ) = −
[
1
ν − 1 −
1
θ − 1
ξ − 1
ξ
]−1
log (τ) + const.
From the above expression it is clear that if ξ is close to one, then the term
(ξ − 1)/ξ is approximately zero and the heterogeneous firm model is very close
to the representative firm model (11).
30
0 5 10 15 20 25
10
20
30
40
50
Trade costs decrease −∆τ%
Exporters Mx
 
 
Strict Sorting
Latent Het.
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
10
20
30
40
50
Trade costs decrease −∆τ%
Exporter Employment Lx
Figure 3. Entry and Employment Growth by Exporters Trade costs decrease in
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5.2. Margins of adjustment
Behind the similarities in the response of aggregate trade, the models display
marked differences in the adjustment in the number of exporters. The top panel
in Figure 3 plots the growth rate in the number of exporters for each model. In
the strict sorting model the number of exporters grows very fast. Entry drives
up the number of exporters by almost 60 percent when trade costs fall by 25
percentage points. Even with a small drop in trade costs, such as 5 percentage
points, the number of exporters grows by more than 10 percent, suggesting
that even at relatively high frequencies entry could play an important role.
In contrast, there is not much entry in the foreign market in the latent
heterogeneity model. The growth rate of the number of exporters barely gets
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over 15 percent, one fourth of the growth in the strict sorting model. For smaller
trade cost reductions such as 5 percent, the number of exporters is very close to
flat. The similarities for total trade volume only make the differences in entry
even more striking.25
We seek to quantify further the role of export entry in both models. We
decompose the growth rate of exports in the change of export intensity and
participation,
∆log(Y f ) = ∆log(rf ) + ∆log(Mx). (14)
The first term on the right-hand side is the intensive margin, that is, the
growth rate on the average export revenues per exporter; and the second is
the extensive margin, or the growth in the number of exporters. We normalize
export growth by total sales and express each margin as a percentage of the
total.26 Table 6 collects the results for trade cost reductions of 5, 15, and 25
percentage points. In the strict sorting model the extensive margin is more
than 60 percent of the growth rate in exports. However, entry plays a much
more minor role in the latent heterogeneity model, just below 20 percent.27
These numbers are very similar across the range of trade cost cuts. They are
25. Differences in entry rates remain relevant even if both models are similar on the
aggregate. First, it provides an additional set of predictions to contrast with the data.
Second, entry is key to determine the impact of trade on aggregate productivity.
26. We are following Alessandria and Choi (2012) closely, although we do not distinguish
between export intensity and premium as they do.
27. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) also find that only a small fraction of trade growth
is due to the extensive margin.
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also quite robust to alternative parameterizations for elasticities. This leads us
to the conclusion that the Melitz model is at odds with a large role for the
extensive margin, once it is augmented to account for the share and size of
exporters.
Trade Cost Decrease
Model 5 15 25
Strict Sorting 63.3% 63.3% 63.5%
Latent Heterogeneity 19.2% 19.8% 20.4%
Table 6. The role of the extensive margin. Trade Costs decrease in percentage
points.
The reader may be wondering how the two models can have such different
entry rates and yet very similar export growth. The bottom panel of Figure
3 clues us in. Despite having much lower entry rates, total employment by
exporters actually grows much faster in the latent heterogeneity model. The
reason is that new exporters are very different in the two models. In the
strict sorting model new exporters are very small in comparison with the
incumbent exporters, about 10 times smaller than the average exporter size
prior to trade liberalization.28 This is a direct consequence of the strict sorting:
since exporters are almost 100 times larger than non-exporters, the firm at the
threshold is still quite large compared with non-exporters but, more important,
it is very small compared with exporters. Returning to Table 2 in Section 2,
the smallest exporter has about 5 times more total sales than the average
non-exporter, but 18 times less total sales than the average exporter.
28. Because previous exporters grow rapidly with the trade liberalization, the new
exporters are 50 times smaller when compared with the average size of the incumbent
exporter after trade costs decrease.
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In contrast, new exporters in the latent heterogeneity model are still smaller
than existing exporters, but not by much. For a fall in trade costs of 5
percentage points, new exporters are just 40 percent smaller than the average
exporter size prior to the trade liberalization. If we go all the way to a halving
of trade costs, new exporters are actually 30 percent larger than the average
exporter size prior to the trade liberalization. In short, new exporters are not
very different from the average firm in the industry.
We now evaluate the main mechanism in Melitz (2003), namely, the gains in
average productivity in the industry due to the trade liberalization. We follow
Melitz (2003) and define
ϕˆ =
(
ϕ˜θ−1 +Mx (ϕ˜x/τ)
θ−1) 1θ−1
as the aggregate productivity.29 It must be noted that our model can only do a
partial evaluation. Since we take the wage rate as given, the set of non-exporters
does not change so there are no productivity gains from the exit of the least
productive firms as in Melitz (2003).
We find that aggregate productivity grows significantly less in the latent
heterogeneity model than in the strict sorting model. Figure 4 plots the results.
Aggregate productivity growth in the latent heterogeneity model is about half
the one in the strict sorting model—a ratio that is approximately constant
across the range of trade cost decreases. That productivity gains are smaller
29. Melitz (2003) refers to this as combined average productivity and shows that it
completely summarizes the effects of the distribution of productivity levels on the aggregate
outcome.
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is not surprising given our previous results. Given that we abstract from
exit in the domestic market, it can be said that the mechanism in Melitz
(2003) works through the selection and entry of exporters. First, exporters
are more productive than the average firm, so anything that expands the total
employment of exporters will lead to productivity gains due to composition
effects. Second, new exporters experience a large jump on their output, and
since they are still more productive than most firms in the economy, also induce
gains in aggregate productivity.
Both selection and entry are much weaker in the latent heterogeneity
model than in the strict sorting model. We have seen that strict sorting
greatly overpredicts the size of exporters, that is, their productivity. The latent
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heterogeneity reconciles the model and data: exporters are still more productive
than non-exporters, but only modestly so. Moreover, there is much less entry
in the latent heterogeneity model, so the second source of productivity gains is
weaker too. The latent heterogeneity model makes up for the lower productivity
growth with higher employment growth (see Figure 3), reflecting the differences
in the intensive-extensive margin decomposition across models.
We conclude our analysis with a look at how the average exporter changes
with trade liberalization. Figure 5 displays the average among exporters for
export revenues, export output, average productivity, and total employment.
It must be emphasized that the set of exporters changes as we cut the trade
costs. First, we note that export revenues and output grow much faster in the
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latent heterogeneity model. This is, of course, the flip side of the results on
the extensive margin documented in Table 6. Second, the average productivity
for exporters falls in both models but by different amounts, as shown in the
bottom left panel in Figure 5. In both models new exporters are less productive
than incumbent exporters but in the strict sorting model, they are much less
so. As a result the average productivity among exporters drops by a staggering
6 percent while it only does so a modest 1 percent in the latent heterogeneity
model.
The differences in the average output and productivity of exporters combine
for opposite predictions with respect to total employment for exporter. In the
strict sorting model exporters, on average, employ fewer workers as trade costs
fall. New exporters do employ more workers than they did before entering
the foreign market. However, they are so small compared with the incumbent
exporters that they bring the average down by an astounding 25 percent. Recall
that the number of exporters grows by more than 50 percent so entry has a
big impact on averages. In contrast, total employment for exporters grows in
the latent heterogeneity model, as the weaker selection and entry effects cannot
overturn the employment gains due to overall expansion of exports.
5.3. Robustness
We briefly discuss here alternative specifications for the common structure
of both models. We start with our choice of the lognormal distribution for
firm productivity. In particular, theory work has favored instead the Pareto
distribution for its tractability. However, the Pareto distribution proves to
be a very restrictive choice for our purposes. A Pareto distribution for
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firm productivity actually implies that average export sales per exporter are
constant: while existing exporters sell more, new and thus smaller exporters
enter until the average export sales returns to the previous value, pinned down
by the entry cost. Hence the growth rate of trade will be equal to the growth
rate of entry.30 This exclusive role of the extensive margin is clearly at odds
with the data.
Baseline θ = 12 ν = 3
SS LH SS LH SS LH
Total Exports 52.8 55.8 52.3 54.1 23.3 23.7
Number of Exporters 20.3 6.1 20.1 6.0 7.7 2.4
Agg. Productivity 0.5 0.2 0.1 0 0.5 0.2
Table 7. Robustness analysis. All variables are growth percentage rates after a fall of
10 percentage points in trade.
Finally, we also explore some alternative parameter specifications. Table 7
reports the several moments for both the strict sorting (SS) and the latent
heterogeneity (LH) model. We consider two alternative parameterizations. In
the first, we set the elasticity of substitution between exports to 12. There is no
significant change for both models’ predictions for the growth rate of exports
and exporters, but there is now virtually no aggregate productivity growth.
This shows that the “love of variety” effect is the main driver of aggregate
productivity. We also look at a second parametrization with a very low price
elasticity of aggregate exports. Naturally, total trade growth is smaller as
30. It is important to recall that we have abstracted from general equilibrium effects on the
wage rate, which, in turn, could have affected the fixed costs associated with exporting. This
channel is operative in Melitz (2003) and leads to adjustment along the intensive margin.
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demand does not react to the fall in costs. Interestingly aggregate productivity
displays similar gains.
6. Beyond fixed costs
6.1. Heterogeneity in trade costs and foreign demand
An obvious alternative to heterogeneous fixed costs is that firms may have
idiosyncratic trade costs or perhaps foreign consumers do not value quality as
domestic consumers do.31 Since foreign sales are a small fraction of total sales
for U.S. firms, heterogeneity in trade costs or foreign demand would be only
weakly correlated with total sales and uncorrelated with domestic sales.
We find that the model implications are virtually unchanged if the necessary
variation to match the data is modeled as heterogeneous fixed costs, trade costs,
or foreign demand.32 As long as the additional heterogeneity enters the exporter
revenues multiplicatively, then the resulting model is actually isomorphic to
heterogeneity in fixed costs. The reason is that the model is essentially loglinear.
Consider this simple specification: on top of the trade costs τ , the marginal cost
of firm’s ω exports is (1 + η (ω)) times more than the marginal cost for output
sold at the domestic market. That is, firms differ on the variable costs associated
31. Munch and Nguyen (2008) find that firm-specific factors such as productivity explain
a very small fraction of the sales variation across destinations for Danish exporters.
32. As long, of course, as the full amount of latent heterogeneity is captured by the
specification of choice.
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with exporting. We can rewrite (9) in this model as
rf (ω) =
(
ϕ (ω)
ϕ˜x
)θ−1
(1 + η (ω))−θ
Rf
Mx
.
The entry condition (10) would now be
(
ϕ (ω)
ϕ˜x
)θ−1
(1 + η (ω))−θ
Rf
Mx
≥ θf (ω) .
We could, though, simply define f˜ (ω) = f (ω) (1 + η (ω))θ and the equilibrium
condition is identical. Quantitatively we would calibrate the distribution of
both η and f to reproduce the variation in the latent variable—in other words,
we would calibrate the variable f˜ (ω) as we did with f (ω) in Section 4. So as
long η and f remain independent of ϕ, the results would be unchanged.
6.2. Sunk Costs
It is well known that the data display a large amount of exporter hysteresis.
While we are not concerned with the dynamics of exporting per se, export
hysteresis has important implications for the cross-section of exporters.
Consider a simple model that combines a fixed per-period cost of exporting
with a sunk cost of entry in the foreign market.33 In the presence of sunk costs,
the exporter status of a firm is not determined by its current productivity
33. Baldwin (1988) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) are credited with developing the
first theories of export hysteresis. Roberts and Tybout (1997) evaluate empirically the role of
sunk costs through reduced-form models. More recent work has estimated structural models
with sunk costs; see Das et al. (2007) and Ruhl and Willis (2008), as well as Alessandria
and Choi (2007, 2013).
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alone. An exporter may have no reason to stop exporting for productivity level
ϕ, since it can still cover per-period fixed costs. The same productivity level,
though, may not be high enough to convince a firm to start exporting as it
will not cover the sunk costs. It is thus possible that the history of each firm
provides the necessary heterogeneity to match the exporter size premium.
While the sunk cost model breaks the strict sorting between exporters and
non-exporters, it now features strict sorting between new exporters and non-
exporters. Because the entry rate is so small, the threshold for entry must be
way deep in the tail of the distribution. In the online Appendix we provide
a simple analysis of a sunk cost model, based on the approach developed in
Section 3. We find that new exporters would be predicted to about 200 times
larger than non-exporters, and several times bigger than existing exporters.
All empirical evidence points to new exporters being significantly smaller than
existing exporters—so it looks like to reconcile the sunk cost model with the size
of new exporters we will need, again, a lot of idiosyncratic variation independent
of firm size.
6.3. Relaxing independence
We now drop the assumption that the latent variable ti is independent of
firm size. Some firm characteristics—e.g., managerial quality, geographical
location—may simultaneously affect total sales and the costs associated with
exporting.
We now allow for total sales and the latent variable {ri, ti} to be jointly
distributed according to a log-normal distribution with mean µ and variance-
covariance matrix Σ. We parameterize the joint distribution in terms of the
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latent variable as log(ti) = γ log(ri) + log(εi), where εi is independent of total
sales ri and distributed according to a log-normal distribution with mean µε
and standard deviation σε. The parameter γ governs the correlation between
total sales ri and the latent variable ti.
It is easy to rewrite the model in terms of total sales ri and independent
variation εi. Firm i exports if ri ≥ ti, or, in logs and in terms of εi,
(1 − γ) log(ri) ≥ log(εi). Given a value for γ we can proceed as we did in
Section 3 to find values for µε and σε such that the model matches the share
and size of exporters observed in the data.
We find that total sales and the latent variable have to be positively
correlated in order to reduce the amount of variation independent of firm size,
that is, γ > 0. The reason is quite straightforward. Strict sorting overestimates
the size of exporters. Having larger firms clear, on average, a higher hurdle to
start exporting reduces the number of large firms that export, and allows the
model to match the data with less size-independent variation.
A positive correlation between firm-size and the latent variable questions
the hypothesis that firms face fixed costs associated with exporting. A more
natural explanation is that domestic and export production both require some
input that is on a fixed supply at the firm level like, for example, a manager’s
limited span of control as in Lucas (1978). That said, the positive correlation
does not rule out non-convexities but rather suggests that they require a more
nuanced approach. For example, Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993) assume that
firms face some down time when replacing “machines” or, more generally, when
pursuing some investment such as upgrading the production process. The non-
convexity arises because it is not possible to replace, say, a fraction of a machine
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with a fraction of the down time. The down time is more expensive for more
productive firms, so while the investment technology is identical across firms,
the cost of investment is higher for larger firms.
6.4. Zeros without economies of scale
Economies of scale are not the only basis for non-exporters. An alternative is
that firms compete head-to-head abroad, with some firms losing out to foreign
producers and thus failing to export. This is, in a nutshell, the model in Bernard
et al. (2003). More productive firms are more likely to export, but there is no
strict sorting, as a small, less productive firm may be lucky enough to be
competing with a very low-productivity foreign competitor while a large firm
may instead face a juggernaut. However, Bernard et al. (2003) are only able to
match the observed exporter size premium by overstating the share of exporters.
Once the model is set to reproduce the observed share of exporters, it predicts
an exporter size premium about 75.34
Yet another alternative put forward by Armenter and Koren (forthcoming)
is that all firms have a chance to export but, due to the sparsity of the data,
not all of them do so during a given year. But, as Armenter and Koren
(forthcoming) report, sparsity cannot explain the low number of exporters.
Interestingly, it also overpredicts the size of exporters despite that there is no
strict sorting in their model.
34. See the online Appendix for details.
43
6.5. Asking the data
Ultimately, which are the key determinants of a firm’s export status is a
question that should be posed to the data. Perhaps the geographical location
plays an important role? Does other international linkages—imported inputs
or FDI—increase the likelihood that a firm exports? Unfortunately, our data
are severely limited in this aspect and we can only address one hypothesis: that
the latent heterogeneity stems from between-industry variation. Manufacturing
includes goods as diverse as tobacco products and machinery. So it is quite
reasonable to think that sectors face very different trade costs, both fixed and
variable. In the online Appendix we estimate the size premium implied by
strict sorting for each three-digit NAICS industry code.35 The procedure is the
same as the one we used in Section 2 for manufacturing as a whole. Sectors
vary greatly regarding the share of firms exporting. In Printing only 5 percent
of the firms exports, while in Computers and Electronic Products almost 40
percent of the firms do.
We find that for each sector the predicted exporter-size premium is very
large, well above any estimate. The reason is that the firm size distribution
within a sector remains very skewed, so any strict sorting exercise is bound
to return large size premia. The differences on the share of exporters does
create a lot of variation in the implied size premiums across sectors. However,
it does not get them in the range observed in the data. Heavily traded
sectors, like computer or electrical equipment, have implied size premiums of
35. Unfortunately we do not have access to the same data for finer levels of disaggregation.
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a magnitude comparable to the manufacturing sector as a whole. Machinery
(another commonly traded) has a somewhat lower size premium, between 40
and 50, but it is still well above the differences documented in the data.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have argued that a simple Melitz model cannot match
quantitatively the basic cross-sectional facts about exporters, namely, their
frequency and size. The model can be easily reconciled with the data by
introducing enough additional sources of variation. We find, though, that a
large amount of variation independent of firm size—and thus, unexplained—is
needed. Moreover, introducing the additional variation can change the model’s
implications in the event of a trade liberalization. It is thus imperative for any
quantitative model operating a selection mechanism a la Melitz to be able to
match both the share of exporters and their size premium.
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